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Foreign direct investment is hardly a new  subject for controversy, whether 
among policymakers or among economic analysts. Until the 1980s, the contro- 
versy centered primarily on outward investments of U.S. multinationals. In- 
deed, so great was the perceived dominance of the United States as quintes- 
sential source country, that the emergence of  significant two-way  flows of 
direct investment has required a fundamental shift in both analytical perspec- 
tive and policy stance. 
Statistics on inward direct investment document a dramatic turnaround in 
the U.S. position. As a host country, the United States was barely on the map 
during the 1960s, when less than 3 percent of direct investment globally came 
to the United States. In  1987, shortly after the United States had overtaken 
Canada as the leading host in terms of book value of accumulated direct invest- 
ment, the U.S. share of total annual inflows peaked at nearly 50 percent. 
In terms of outward investment, the U.S. position also changed substantially 
as firms based elsewhere became important players. During the 1960s, U.S. 
firms accounted for nearly two-thirds of  all direct investment flows globally. 
By 1987, the U.S. share in total outward investment had dropped to less than 
one-quarter. However, the United States remained a top source country for out- 
ward direct investments. In fact, it was still the leading source country for the 
decade of the 1980s; in terms of annual flows, Japan did not replace the United 
States as the leading source until 1988.' 
When the United States assumed its new role as the world's leading host to 
inward direct investment and Japan took its place as the leading source for new 
1. Flow data are from Lipsey (1984) for the 1960s and from the International Monetary Fund's 
Balance ofPayments Yearbook (1991 and earlier issues) for the 1980s. Shares are based on total 
balance-of-payments flows that include local reinvestment of subsidiary profits but exclude expan- 
sion financed through subsidiaries' local borrowing. On adequacy and interpretation of direct in- 
vestment data, see Stekler and Stevens (1991). 
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outward direct investment, U.S. policy retained the nationalistic “US  versus 
them” orientation of  earlier decades. Where analysts once probed the conse- 
quences for U.S. trade and employment of U.S.-controlled investments abroad 
(e.g., Bergsten, Horst, and Moran 1978),  the same questions have instead been 
raised about the growing domestic role of  foreign subsidiaries of companies 
based in Europe, Canada, and especially Japan. 
There is, however, one striking difference. Where the debate of the 1960s 
and 1970s  often lumped U.S. multinationals with the foreign “them,” the 1990s 
debate prominently includes the impact on U.S.-based firms with the domestic 
“us.” Formerly quoted more as an ironic commentary on U.S. corporate greed, 
Charles Wilson’s  dictum, “What’s  good for General Motors is good for the 
United States,” now merely reflects the conventional wisdom of  many U.S. 
policymakers.*  Rather than the earlier battle of U.S. organized labor against 
footloose U.S.-based multinationals, the recent motif  pits beleaguered U.S. 
companies (capital perhaps even more than labor interests) against rapacious 
foreign-based multinationals. 
This paper reviews the changing composition of  global direct investment 
flows and relates these developments to contemporaneous changes in global 
competition. My  theme is that direct investment is an integral part of  large 
firms’ overall strategy for global production and sales. The emergence of sig- 
nificant two-way direct investment flows signals that U.S. companies no longer 
have a monopoly on the firm-specific competitive advantages required for suc- 
cessful global expansion. 
2.1  Why Firms Invest Abroad 
It comes as no surprise when successful firms expand their operations. In- 
deed, along with profitability, growth is often a yardstick for measuring success 
among firms in an industry. Substantial increases in domestic market share 
rarely come without some geographic expansion, first of sales and service op- 
erations, later of production facilities. However, it is the initial success that 
drives the expansion, both through lower costs associated with the learning 
curve and through increased access to and thus lower cost of financial capital. 
Sooner or later-usually  later for firms located in large domestic markets 
such as the United States, earlier for firms located in small markets such as 
Switzerland-the  expansion process spills over into foreign markets (Caves 
1982,44). In manufacturing, exports typically come first, accompanied or fol- 
lowed by  investments in  sales and  service facilities (Bergsten, Horst, and 
Moran 1978, chap. 3). After a successful trade initiative, establishment of pro- 
2. According to Webber and Taylor (1992). Wilson’s actual words and meaning were somewhat 
different. In 1953 hearings on his nomination to become secretary of defense, Wilson was asked 
whether he would be willing to make a decision with adverse consequences for General Motors. 
Wilson replied that he would but that he could not conceive of a need to do so, “because for years 
I have thought that what was good for our country was good for General Motors-and  vice versa.” 39  New Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
duction facilities close to the new markets is often the next step. Depending on 
cost conditions, some subsidiary production may eventually replace domestic 
production even in supplying the home market. This process can entail plant 
closings, but firms have an incentive to take the less conspicuous approach of 
sourcing only increases in domestic sales from foreign ~ubsidiaries.~ 
In this account, both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are simply 
aspects of competition among (large) firms. During the early postwar period, 
burgeoning U.S. exports and the contemporaneous expansion abroad of U.S. 
companies were reflections of the same underlying circumstance, namely that 
most of the world’s highly competitive companies were American. Trade statis- 
tics for the subsequent decades chronicle a steady deterioration in the relative 
attractiveness  of  the  United  States  as  a  site  for  export  production,  as 
measured by  the share of  total world manufactured exports produced in the 
United States. 
Over the same period, U.S.-based multinationals also lost ground, as mea- 
sured by  their share (U.S. plus foreign subsidiary production combined) in 
total world exports, although the loss was not as large as for on-shore produc- 
tion  A similar picture emerges from statistics on production for the 
U.S. domestic market. For  manufacturing as a whole and for almost every 
manufacturing industry taken individually, both imports and foreign-controlled 
domestic production have increased as a share of total domestic sales. 
Trade  theory  provides  a  reasonably  coherent  explanation  for  postwar 
changes in  the  global pattern of  production and,  thus,  for the  associated 
changes in trade flows. Broad trends in the world pattern of production can be 
linked to observed changes in relative factor abundance worldwide as pre- 
dicted by the dominant Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm. But the standard neoclassi- 
cal theory has little to say about the very large firms that carry out much of the 
world’s production and even more of the world’s trade, nor about the ongoing 
process of entry and exit that characterizes most international markets. Trade 
theory is thus relatively good at explaining why country shares of world pro- 
duction are what they are but less good at explaining company shares, or why 
so much  production in  virtually every  nation  is controlled by  companies 
based el~ewhere.~ 
Foreign direct investment has no place in a strictly neoclassical world. Un- 
3. For the service-sector activities that now account for a large part of direct investment, exports 
in the sense of production in one country for sale in another are less often an option; sales may 
require establishment of local facilities. On international competition in services, see McCulloch 
(1988). 
4. On the distinction between the competitiveness of U.S.-based multinationals and that of the 
United States as a location for production, see Lipsey and Kravis (1986). Franko (1991) documents 
the declining position of U.S.-based companies as measured by share of total industry sales world- 
wide. This measure differs from the one used by Lipsey and Kravis, who look at shares in world 
exports rather than total sales. 
5. Although many in the United States are apprehensive about the increasing share of foreign- 
controlled production, the U.S. ratio still looks low in relation to other industrial nations, with the 
significant exception of Japan (Graham  and Krugman 1991, chap. 1). 40  Rachel McCulloch 
der “perfect” competition, atomistic firms all enjoy equal access to technology 
and markets, with none large enough to influence prices of inputs or outputs 
The growth of any one firm’s production beyond the minimum efficient size of 
a single plant requires an explanation, because coordination of  activities in 
multiple locations imposes additional costs. A firm will incur these costs only 
when they are more than offset by associated benefits from internalizing activi- 
ties that could, alternatively, be carried out through market transactions. The 
associated benefits must be larger still if  the multiple locations span several 
nations, as this entails still higher coordination costs. In part, these costs reflect 
the need to deal with several legal systems, tax codes, cultural environments, 
and perhaps languages. Moreover, no host country applies strict national treat- 
ment; operations of foreign-based firms are invariably subject to some types 
of discriminatory policies. 
Foreign direct investment is most prominent in industries where the compet- 
itive paradigm fits least well. Old-style multinationals populated oligopolistic 
natural-resource-based industries such as oil and aluminum. Modern multi- 
nationals thrive in fast-moving Schumpeterian sectors such as pharmaceuticals 
and electronics, where products are differentiated, reputation is vital, and tech- 
nology is firm specific and constantly improving. The competitive advantage 
of these multinationals is created through large investments in advertising and 
in research and development (R&D). Multinational firms typically earn above- 
average rates of return, in relation both to the average for all industries and to 
nonmultinational firms in the same industry. The extra return can be seen as 
rent  earned by  the  intangible assets that  constitute the  firm’s  competitive 
advantage.6 
Firms possessing a competitive advantage such as superior technology, man- 
agerial know-how, established brands, or efficient channels for product distri- 
bution can exploit that advantage in a variety of ways, including but not limited 
to establishment of foreign subsidiaries. The most obvious choice is through 
trade, with all markets sourced from domestic production. Most manufacturing 
firms at least begin with this approach. Why do some choose to incur the extra 
expense of establishing production facilities abroad? Direct investment will be 
chosen instead of, or as an adjunct to, trade only to the extent that the location 
itself confers a substantial advantage to the company. This advantage may re- 
sult from the usual elements of  comparative advantage as reflected in lower 
production cost. Barriers to imports or other host-country policy inducements 
6.  From an industrial-organization perspective, these firm-specific advantages are barriers to 
entry. Empirical studies of several periods and host countries indicate a close relationship between 
seller concentration and the importance of direct investment (Caves 1982, chap. 4). This finding 
does not necessarily imply that seller concentration promotes direct investment, since entry bani- 
ers may affect both seller concentration in a given market and propensity of firms to establish 
foreign production. Morck and Yeung’s (1991) study linking q-ratios to firm  characteristics con- 
cludes that companies with firm-specific intangible assets created through R&D and advertising 
gain additional benefits from multinationality. 41  New Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
also play a role in determining the most advantageous location for produc- 
ti0n.l 
Because expansion through direct investment means higher cost of manage- 
ment, advantageous location is not enough to explain the establishment of for- 
eign subsidiaries. Unless multinationals possess an advantage over local firms 
sufficient to offset the cost of international coordination, the benefits of loca- 
tion will be captured instead by indigenous firms. In the latter case, the foreign 
company’s advantage may be shared with indigenous firms in the preferred 
location through licensing or other types of long-term contracts. 
How a given firm-specific advantage is exploited thus depends on the bal- 
ance, for each potential mode, between the benefits to be derived and the costs 
to be incurred. Relative to direct investment, exports or licensing will typically 
provide lower benefits but entail lower costs. However, coordination costs vary 
across firms; those already large in the home market reveal a firm-specific ad- 
vantage of intrafirm coordination. Small high-technology firms are more likely 
to use exports or licensing agreements to exploit innovations where larger com- 
panies  find  internalization  (i.e.,  establishment of  production  subsidiaries) 
profitable. 
2.2  Exchange Rates and Direct Investment 
Since exchange rate movements are an important determinant of  ex post 
rates of return on many types of internationally traded assets, anticipated move- 
ments in currency values play a significant role in shaping international capital 
transactions. Currency levels may serve as a proxy for anticipated future move- 
ments toward a trend value such as purchasing power parity. This implies an 
essentially speculative investment motive and should thus be more important 
for portfolio than for direct investment, which generally involves a longer plan- 
ning horizon. But even if anticipated currency movements do not affect firms’ 
overall plans for expansion abroad, they may influence timing of flows associ- 
ated with those plans. 
Other things equal, a weaker currency makes a country’s products a better 
buy in world markets. Is the same true for its productive assets? An asset (a 
factory or a hotel, for example) is a claim to a stream of future domestic- 
currency-denominated profits. If those profits will be converted back into the 
currency of  the foreign investor at the same exchange rate, the level of  the 
exchange rate does not affect the present discounted value of the investment; 
neither a permanently strong nor a permanently weak currency alters the antic- 
7. Some advantages of multinational activity are associated with being multinational rather than 
with any specific host location. A global production network permits the firm to diversify risk and, 
more generally, increases its potential for optimizing responses when conditions are volatile (Ko- 
gut 1983). Enhanced opportunities for tax avoidance are an additional benefit; multinational firms 
raise global after-tax profits by using advantageous transfer prices to shift profits to lower-tax juris- 
dictions. 42  Rachel McCulloch 
ipated return. When an activity requires imported inputs or results in exports 
to other markets, the domestic-currency value of the profits will not typically 
be independent of  the exchange rate. However, the direction of  the effect is 
ambiguous-some  investments will become more profitable, others less so, as 
the exchange rate falls.& 
The most important effect of  exchange rates on local-currency profits is 
through production costs. By  raising production costs relative to those else- 
where, an appreciation of the source country’s currency might shift direct in- 
vestors’ locational preference toward other regions. Even so, an advantage of 
integrated global management is still required to make direct investment a 
profitable response to the new currency values. Otherwise, local firms will be 
better able to exploit the locational advantage of  lower production costs.9 
Moreover, lower production costs are obviously not the sole determinant of 
expected profitability. During the U.S. recession of the early 1990s, a weak 
dollar has not been enough to entice foreign investors. 
Given the large swings in key rates during the 1980s, from apparent under- 
valuation to apparent overvaluation and back again, the explanation for in- 
creases during the late 1980s in both inward U.S. investments and direct invest- 
ments worldwide may lie less in the specific level of the exchange rate at the 
time of the investment than in the high probability of future large movements. 
Here the benefit of  global management plays a key  role. Firms with multi- 
national production and sales networks enjoy greater flexibility in  shifting 
marginal production and marginal sales in response to future exchange rate 
realignments.’O 
2.3  The Role of Import Barriers 
International trade theory predicts that restriction of trade flows will stimu- 
late compensating factor flows. If a nation limits imports of autos, for example, 
it seems almost self-evident that frustrated foreign suppliers ought to establish 
domestic production facilities.  ‘I  The automobile and  electronics industries 
8. See Caves (1989). Another argument appeals to a wealth effect on firms facing imperfect 
capital markets. Other things equal, a fall in the dollar increases the wealth of foreign firms and 
thus allows them to outbid their domestic counterparts (Froot and Stein 1991). Long-range corpo- 
rate planning of  investment expenditures in terms of the home currency would have  a similar 
qualitative effect on observed dollar flows. 
9. Aliber (1987,302) cites an overvalued dollar as one factor explaining the dominance of U.S. 
firms among multinationals: “US.  firms were obliged to invest and produce abroad if they were 
to be competitive in foreign markets.” But the strong dollar merely favored a foreign production 
location. Other advantages of U.S. firms must be invoked to explain why these firms could make 
money in head-to-head competition with local competitors. 
10. Lipsey (1991) finds trade of foreign-owned U.S. manufacturing firms more responsive to 
exchange rate movements than is trade of U.S.-owned firms. 
11. Investments can also be the implicit price paid by  foreign firms to avoid the imposition of 
new  trade barriers. Bhagwati (1985) has coined the term quid pro quo investment to describe 
this link. 43  New Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
seem to offer visible support worldwide for the proposition. Yet statistical anal- 
yses do not always confirm a strong systematic relationship. 
One likely reason for the weak empirical findings is that protection creates 
a locational advantage by raising the cost of serving the market through trade. 
In some cases, this locational advantage does promote foreign investment; in 
others, it affects mainly domestic entry and exit. When there is no firm-specific 
competitive advantage best exploited through integrated global management, 
domestic producers should be better able than subsidiaries of foreign compa- 
nies to capture the benefits of local production.’* 
The conspicuous cases of autos and electronics, important though they are 
in their own right, may not point to a general rule. In these industries, techno- 
logical and managerial know-how provides advantages that allow foreign pro- 
ducers to compete effectively with established domestic firms. By contrast, the 
highly  protected apparel and footwear industries have  seen relatively little 
direct investment from  abroad. For  these low-technology industries, firm- 
specific advantages are apparently too small to offset the greater costs incurred 
by foreign investors.13 
Evidence at the country rather than the industry level also casts doubt on the 
role of  protection as a strong magnet for inward direct investment. Among 
developing countries, open export-oriented economies such as Hong Kong 
have been more successful than nations pursuing import substitution strategies 
in attracting new investment. Among the industrial nations, the most important 
host countries have been Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Germany, all with relatively liberal trade regimes. 
2.4  What Firms Do When They “Invest Abroad” 
Direct investment, particularly in the manufacturing sector, is often dis- 
cussed under the heading “location of production,” implying that the central 
issue affected by investment decisions is where production is located. As sug- 
gested above, the focus on location is misleading. Foreign direct investment is, 
by definition, the acquisition by a firm in one country of control over business 
activity in a second country. This may or may not be associated with a change 
in the location of production, but it is necessarily associated with a change in 
which  firm controls production in that location. In particular, for the significant 
fraction of direct investment that entails acquisition of  an existing local busi- 
12. A separate explanation of weak results in cross-sectional studies relating direct investment 
to tariffs is that tariff rates change over time and many other economic developments also affect 
the level of  subsidiary activity at any given date. Thus, current activity and current tariff rate may 
not be closely related “even if that relationship was originally a potent one” (Caves 1982,  41). 
13. Changing cost conditions and extension of the Multi-Fiber Agreement to new production 
locations have given rise to short-lived direct investments based mainly on firm-specific advan- 
tages in the marketing of apparel. Such foreign operations, established, for example, by Taiwanese 
and Korean firms in Thailand and Malaysia, later pass into the hands of local investors. 44  Rachel McCulloch 
ness, the transaction can alter control while leaving location of  production 
unchanged. 
Foreign direct investment is an intrinsic element of competition for market 
share within an industry. The typical pattern for U.S. companies in the 1960s, 
as well as for Japanese companies in the 1980s,  was for global market share to 
grow simultaneously through exports and through direct investment abroad.I4 
Viewing foreign investment mainly in terms of relocation of production begs 
the central issue. 
A production site can become more attractive because of  factors such as 
proximity to a growing market, changing cost structure, host-region incentives, 
or trade barriers; each of these has the potential to alter a firm’s decision regard- 
ing location of production. However, such location factors do not explain why 
a foreign-based firm is able to increase its share of control over production in 
that location. A focus on location thus ignores the question of why particular 
firms are best able to exploit the advantages of that location. 
Although it is crucial in understanding foreign direct investment, the distinc- 
tion between location and firm-specific advantage may be easier to see in the 
more familiar case of  domestic competition. The success of  Houston-based 
Compaq in the market for IBM-compatible computers was primarily news 
about Compaq’s growing share-at  Il3M’s expense-in  the U.S. market, not 
about the relocation of  computer production facilities to Texas. In the many 
business press  stories analyzing Compaq’s rise, the Houston location was 
rarely if ever mentioned as a factor. The reason is obvious. Unlike other clone 
manufacturers, Compaq’s success was due primarily to superior product rather 
than low cost. The Texas location may  have been an advantage, but not the 
advantage. (Any Texas advantage was clearly not sufficient to save Texas In- 
struments, which dropped out of the market for PCs and other consumer prod- 
ucts in the early 1980s.) 
Compaq’s growth was due primarily to a firm-specific competitive advan- 
tage over its rivals, an advantage that allowed it to increase market share while 
selling its products at a premium over other clone manufacturers. But, for the 
same reason, Compaq’s initial success could not last. As other companies came 
closer to, or even exceeded, Compaq’s quality standard while offering a sub- 
stantially lower price, erosion of market share became inevitable. 
At this later stage, where no one producer enjoys a significant product ad- 
vantage (lower-end PCs are now described as having reached “commodity” 
status), location of production may appear to become the critical issue. Costs 
14. The resulting positive correlation between exports and controlled foreign production led 
some analysts in the 1960s to conclude that firms’ global expansion caused the growth of U.S. 
exports. The reality was, as suggested, more complex. Both types of growth were manifestations 
of the competitive strength of U.S.-based companies. Nonetheless, some level of direct investment 
abroad in the form of distribution and service facilities is almost a requirement for strong export 
performance. Until the mid-1980s. much Japanese investment in the United States was of this 
export-facilitating type. 45  New Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
in, say, Singapore or Taiwan are lower than in Houston; costs in Malaysia and 
China are even less. But all potential competitors, including firms already es- 
tablished in those regions, have the option to locate production so as to benefit 
from the lower costs. The interesting question from an analytical perspective 
still is: who controls the production, and why? 
The numbers reveal that both Compaq and IBM are losing market share in 
the commodity environment, even though both now produce much of their 
output offshore. The firm-specific advantages that allowed first IBM and then 
Compaq to dominate the market are now insufficient to offset their disadvan- 
tage relative to the clones, presumably the disadvantage of higher costs of co- 
ordinating global production and sales. Who has lower coordinating costs? The 
answer may be, literally, no one. As firm-specific product or service advantages 
become less important, the market itself may provide a more efficient alterna- 
tive to coordination within any multinational firm. The benefits of expansion, 
whether domestic or international, must be balanced against costs. Some costs 
decline with size; others grow exponentially. Bigger, as both IBM and General 
Motors amply illustrate, is not always better. 
2.5  Trade and Employment Impact 
Most economists agree that the extent of direct investment has minimal con- 
sequences for a nation's aggregate employment, yet both enthusiasts and critics 
focus their attention on the assumed impact on trade and associated changes 
in employment opportunities. Direct investment can have significant trade and 
employment effects at the industry or regional level. Anticipated trade and 
employment effects are important in shaping policy, but actual impacts are 
complex to identify, even ex post, and tend to be offset at the country level by 
induced changes elsewhere in the economy. 
Direct investments can take one of two forms. A greenfield investment en- 
tails construction of new physical plant. Alternatively, investment may be car- 
ried out through merger with or acquisition of an existing domestic pr~ducer.'~ 
Greenfield investments are eagerly sought by  host regions because they are 
perceived to provide a net increase in capital stock, with corresponding impli- 
cations for regional trade and employment. In particular, greenfield invest- 
ments are assumed to expand output of  the domestic industry, thus allowing 
reduced imports or increased exports; more production is anticipated to mean 
new jobs, at least for the industry. Typically more controversial are investments 
that entail merger with or acquisition of an existing local business, as these are 
less obviously a source of positive trade effects and new jobs. (The associated 
change of management is also often bad news for incumbent executives, who 
may have considerable political influence at the local level.) 
15. Actual investments often combine the two basic types, so that a merger or takeover may 
also include substantial additions to plant. In some cases, a takeover transfers ownership from one 
foreign parent to another. 46  Rachel McCulloch 
Missing from the  standard interpretation is  an  explicit statement of  the 
counterfactual: that is, what would have happened in the absence of the invest- 
ment. Without the greenfield investment, an  existing producer might have 
added to domestic capacity; given the foreign investor’s presence, another pro- 
ducer may decide to exit from the industry. The presumption of a net addition 
to industry capacity thus rests on the implicit and questionable assumption that 
other firms already established do not change their own investment decisions 
in response to the new circumstances. 
Standard inferences for trade and for industry employment rest  on even 
shakier ground. The prediction of favorable trade balance effects relies on the 
assumption that total domestic output expands relative to demand. Since it is 
unlikely  that overall demand for the product  rises  significantly as  a con- 
sequence  of  new  investment,  new  production  mainly  replaces  reductions 
elsewhere. The key  question is thus whether that “elsewhere” is at home or 
abroad-whether  the new  output substitutes mainly for other domestic pro- 
duction or for foreign production (goods otherwise imported or goods other- 
wise produced abroad for other markets).16 
Even one-for-one substitution of domestic production for foreign production 
is unlikely to translate into equal changes in trade flows. Foreign-controlled 
producers typically use a higher percentage of imported intermediate inputs.” 
Positive trade balance effects in the first industry will then be offset at least in 
part by corresponding changes in the trade positions of the industries produc- 
ing these inputs. Induced exchange rate movements or other associated macro- 
economic developments are a further offset to any impact beyond the industry 
level. Working in  the opposite direction is the possibility that foreign-based 
firms may, especially in the longer run, prove to be more adept than their do- 
mestic counterparts in exporting to markets elsewhere. But again, this is likely 
to be offset in the aggregate by other induced changes economywide. 
Although it is reasonable to assume that a favorable trade impact will trans- 
late into an increase in industry jobs, the effect will be diluted if the investor’s 
competitive advantage includes higher efficiency in production. In this case, 
the investment is desirable precisely because it does raise productive effi- 
ciency; the emphasis on industry job creation thus distracts from the real gains 
from upgrading productive efficiency.1s 
Even ex post empirical data cannot be used to settle this issue. For example, 
further deterioration in an industry’s trade position or employment tells only 
16. To  the extent that direct investment increases efficiency and competition in the industry, 
total sales should rise relative to what they would otherwise have been. In most cases, however, 
this effect will be small relative to the substitution among alternative sources of supply. 
17. On this point and the relationship between foreign ownership and trade performance more 
broadly, see Lipsey (1991). 
18. Empirical evidence for the United States suggests that foreign owners pay roughly the same 
wages as domestic owners in the same industry but have higher output per worker. For compari- 
sons of  US.-controlled  and foreign-controlled  US.  companies,  see  Leonard  and McCulloch 
(1991) and Graham and Krugman (1991, chap. 3). 47  New  Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
what did happen, not what would have happened in the absence of an invest- 
ment. The 1960s debate concerning the domestic trade and employment conse- 
quences of  U.S. direct investments abroad produced predictions of  sectoral 
effects that ranged from strongly negative to strongly positive. The large dis- 
crepancies arose mainly from contradictory assumptions concerning the sub- 
stitution among alternative locations of produ~tion.'~  In light of the prevailing 
U.S. view that Japanese-controlled U.S. factories import too much of  their 
intermediate inputs, it is interesting that the relatively high reliance of  U.S. 
subsidiaries abroad on imported inputs was cited in the 1970s as one reason to 
expect favorable effects on domestic employment from foreign expansion of 
U.S. multinationals.20 
The same qualification applies to the standard presumption concerning in- 
dustry trade and employment impact of investment via merger or acquisition. 
The critical assumption is that domestic output remains the same. Yet  such 
transactions often involve a domestic competitor too weak to  survive on its 
own. In this case, the investment may add industry jobs to the ones that would 
have remained had the acquired firm exited instead.21  This may be true even 
when actual firm and industry employment fall, as might be expected if the 
takeover raises productivity. 
2.6  Impact on Industry Competition and Profits 
Like expanded imports, ownership of local operations is basically a way for 
highly competitive foreign firms to expand their presence in a given market. 
As long as this expansion does not reduce the number of  active competitors 
serving the market, its most predictable effect is to reduce profits of firms al- 
ready in that market. This should hold both for domestic firms and for foreign 
firms that have previously entered the market through exports or direct invest- 
ment, and the typical behavior of established firms in the affected industry is 
consistent with this outcome. As with competition from imports, beleaguered 
domestic firms are apt to label the activities of their foreign-controlled rivals 
as unfair or detrimental to the national interest. 
Yet, as with other forms of entry, the net effect is not always to increase the 
number of active competitors. Takeovers of existing firms may leave the num- 
19. Researchers in the early 1970s estimated net U.S. employment impacts ranging from losses 
close to half a million jobs to gains of  a similar magnitude. OECD (1987, 212) compares six 
major studies. 
20. A quaint echo of the earlier debate can be found in chapter 7 of the 1991 Economic Report 
of the President, which cites increased demand for exports of U.S. production inputs among the 
likely benefits of expansion abroad of U.S. multinationals. The discussion asserts that if U.S.  firms 
did not produce abroad, the markets would typically be lost to other suppliers-in  other words, 
that controlled foreign production rarely substitutes for exports. 
21. On the other hand, even an infusion of whatever foreign investors bring may not be enough 
to save a weak domestic firm,  as with Renault's majority interest in the now-defunct American 
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ber constant or even reduce it; also, as suggested above, greenfield investment 
may induce exit by one or more incumbent firms. Moreover, some analysts in 
the 1970s suggested that entry via direct investment could help to maintain a 
stable pattern of oligopoly.zz 
Direct investments can also influence profits of firms that do not compete 
directly. The new entrants’ operations change demand for productive inputs 
and for other outputs, thus affecting profits of related industries. Investments 
also affect regional and national tax revenuesz3  and public expenditures. Oppo- 
sition to locally provided inducement packages often comes from established 
firms in unrelated industries. These firms anticipate unfavorable effects on 
their own profits via higher future taxes and increased competition for skilled 
workers. In the longermn, foreign ownership is likely to affect-for  better or 
for worse-even  the legal structure within which the industry operates, as new 
owners lobby for advantageous legislative and regulatory action. 
2.7  Policy toward Direct Investment 
Nearly all countries make efforts to attract inward direct investment; at the 
same time, most also impose limits on access and otherwise restrict the activi- 
ties of foreign-controlled  companies within their borders. This carrot-and-stick 
approach can have important consequences  for the location of economic activ- 
ity and for the efficiency of that activity in any given location. In particular, 
investment policies can have predictable effects on trade flows, effects similar 
to those of policies aimed explicitly at trade: reducing imports, expanding ex- 
ports, or both. Along with other nontariff measures that influence trade, invest- 
ment policies have become more conspicuous in recent decades. As successive 
rounds of  negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have reduced the importance of tariffs, a major unanticipated result 
has been expanded use of investment measures and other “opaque” forms of 
protection. 
The Uruguay Round is the first GATT round to attempt negotiations on poli- 
cies toward foreign direct investment. Some past agenda items (e.g., subsidies) 
have been comparable in importance to members’ perceived ability to control 
domestic economic activity, but none has been such a core issue in terms of 
national sovereignty. In the case of direct investment, the national policies in 
question aim specifically at regulating the extent and character of  foreign- 
controlled production within the nation’s own boundaries. Moreover, as dis- 
cussed above, direct investment tends by  its very  nature to be concentrated 
in sectors of the economy that conform least well to the paradigm of perfect 
22. For example, Graham (1978). On the general issue of  direct investment as a form of  entry, 
23. Despite the notorious tax-avoidance techniques of multinationals, tax revenue remains the 
also see Caves (1982, chap. 4). 
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competition. Thus, standard efficiency arguments for laissez-faire are unlikely 
to hold without significant qualification. 
2.8  A “New” Investment Theory? 
The nature of direct investment implies that firms engaging in it will typi- 
cally earn what might be considered supernormal profits. As the “new” trade 
theory dealing with imperfect competition has suggested,  the existence  of such 
rents creates an additional class of arguments for intervention. The basic theme 
is that a nation can use trade policy to garner a larger share of the industry’s 
worldwide rents. However, this new class of  arguments has met with a cool 
reception. The theoretical case for any particular policy prescription is highly 
sensitive to modeling assumptions. Those with practical bent note that condi- 
tions in few, if any, real-world industries remotely resemble those required to 
make the case for national-welfare-enhancing  policies along these lines; more- 
over, the policy process is unlikely to be endowed with the pinpoint accuracy 
required to ensure national welfare gains rather than losses. Most believe that 
this new literature, like the older one based on infant industries and other mar- 
ket distortions, yields little guidance for policymaking; adherence to free trade 
is still seen as the best practical advice.24 
Is the rent-grabbing motive more persuasive for investment than for trade? 
As with policies toward trade, national policies aimed at investment tend in 
practice to reduce global efficiency via suboptimal allocation of resources in 
production and via associated rent-seeking activities. An important difference, 
however, is that investment policies are less likely to reduce the country’s own 
aggregate welfare than are those aimed directly at trade flows. International 
cooperation to avoid a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation may therefore be more 
important than in the case of trade.25 
For a country small enough to have no appreciable effect on world prices, 
the cost of tariff protection is borne almost entirely by the county itself. Even 
for large countries, the net effect of protection on national welfare is typically 
negative. But when a tariff creates an incentive for import-substituting  direct 
investment and investment policies are then used to extract some part of  the 
rents generated by  foreign-controlled production for the local market, the 
country may in fact gainz6  However, the foreign investor will also gain (or 
24. For example, Pomfret (1991) argues that the new case for protection is deficient even for jet 
aircraft, the real-world industry closest to satisfying the conditions of the models. 
25. The policy process itself and the attempts of firms to shape policy and to maximize their 
benefits within any policy environment also use resources. Even when the location and operation 
of a footloose investment is, in the end, unaffected by  competition among rival would-be hosts, 
the rent-seeking process may entail a substantial social cost. 
26. The most obvious channel is via the host country taxation of multinational  profits (see Caves 
1982, chap. 10). However, profits may also be taxed implicitly through performance requirements 
imposed on foreign-controlled  firms. Labor employed by  subsidiaries  can also capture part of the 
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expect to gain), at least relative to the situation of protection but no invest- 
ment. 
For example, assume that a monopoly producer would otherwise serve the 
local market through imports from plants elsewhere at a fixed marginal cost, 
but a sufficiently high tariff barrier makes local production the monopolist’s 
preferred alternative. Although less profitable for the monopolist than  the 
laissez-faire situation, local production is likely to mean a lower marginal cost 
of serving the market. Thus, the monopolist will maximize profits by selling a 
larger volume of  output at a lower price than before the tariff was imposed. 
The host thus gains relative to free trade.27  This gain is augmented by any local 
tax revenue generated or rents incorporated in wages paid to local workers.28 
Corresponding losses, although potentially larger in the aggregate, will be 
spread among other nations (in the example, the main loser is the alternative 
production site)29  but may be small for any one of them. An important implica- 
tion is that the “problem” of investment policies is at least in part of problem of 
incomplete liberalization of trade that creates a locational advantage. Without 
tariffs, quotas, and other important barriers, there would be less rent to extract 
and thus less scope for performance requirements. Likewise, harmonization of 
taxation across potential hosts would reduce the scope for rent-shifting via 
tax incentives. 
Efforts to bring investment policies under GATT discipline have come prin- 
cipally from the United States, propelled by  the perceived interests of  some 
U.S.-based multinational firms. Yet, while there is no question that many U.S.- 
based firms have been affected by  investment policies of  host countries, the 
evidence is far from conclusive that source countries such as the United States 
have been harmed significantly by the use of these policies. In some instances, 
as illustrated in the example above, the host country and the source country 
can both benefit on net at the expense of  numerous “third” nations, each of 
which, however, bears only a small part of the cost. 
Moreover, there is still less evidence to suggest that trade-related investment 
policies currently exert an important independent influence on global patterns 
of production and trade, especially in relation, say, to the remaining egregious 
27. Free trade is not the optimal policy for a small country facing a monopoly producer (see 
Grossman 1990). However, implementation of the optimal policy requires extensive cost informa- 
tion as well as an enforcement capability. The second-best approach of forcing the monopolist to 
produce locally may be, from a practical point of view, the more attractive option. 
28. In the example, a tariff provides the inducement to relocate. An alternative inducement could 
be favorable tax treatment. In this case, even the multinational may be better off relative to the 
initial equilibrium. The potential gains to the firm and the host region come in part from increased 
sales in the host market and in part from a shift in rents to the host (as taxes or wages) and to the 
firm (as higher after-tax profits). 
29. Although the existence of monopoly implies that efficiency may be raised by intervention, 
the benefits to the host and firm reflect mainly the transfer of rents that would have accrued to a 
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and well-documented barriers in textiles and apparel and in agric~lture.~~  The 
main effect of most investment measures, at least in the medium term, is to 
shift rents between the source and the host ~ountry.~' 
2.9  What Role for the United States? 
The greatly increased extent of two-way foreign direct investment and even 
of two-way flows within a given industry has blurred the distinction, at least 
among industrial nations, between host and source countries. In  the 1960s, 
the United States was the preeminent source country and thus also the most 
conspicuous potential beneficiary of international limits on nationalistic poli- 
cies of host countries. In the 1990s, the United States remains a major source 
country as well as the strongest voice for international action to regulate invest- 
ment policies. Yet it has also become the world's most important host to direct 
investment, with all the new political pressures that entails. Correspondingly, 
the European Community, Canada, and Japan have gained a new stake in plac- 
ing  limits  on  host  country  investment  policies,  particularly  those  of  the 
United States.32 
A key policy question on foreign investment for the United States in the 
1990s is analogous to the one raised by the national debate on trade policy a 
decade earlier: whether the United States is willing and able to champion 
global goals even when  this requires  some sacrifice of  perceived  national 
needs. Specifically, is the United States willing and able to continue its leader- 
ship role in combating investment policies that achieve nationalistic objectives 
at the expense of global efficiency? Or will it instead join other host countries 
by  adopting its own nationalistic policies? And should the United States opt 
for the route of  nationalism, will any other country be willing and able to 
assume the responsibility of global leadership on this issue? 
30. The decision to tackle investment measures primarily on the basis of their presumed role 
as nontariff trade distortions neglects important interactions between trade restriction and direct 
investment as joint determinants of the global pattern of production. Changes in trade policies 
have implications for foreign investment decisions; conversely, the effects of  trade policies on 
productive efficiency and income distribution within and across countries depend crucially on the 
extent of induced changes in foreign investment. National investment policies can thus have an 
important though typically indirect influence on the consequences of protection and of trade liber- 
alization. National investment policies may therefore be critical to the success of the GATT even 
though these policies in themselves do not constitute important distortions of trade. 
3 1. Longer-run effects are more complex. If rents are the return to past research and develop- 
ment, policies that reduce the share going to the innovative firms can be expected to discourage 
future innovation. 
32. The convergence of interests may have created a temporary window of opportunity for fruit- 
ful international negotiations on trade-related investment measures (TRIMS). On the likely ele- 
ments of a bargain, see Graham (1991) and Lawrence (1992). 52  Rachel McCulloch 
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Comment  KX~  P.  Sauvant 
Rachel McCulloch’s paper raises a number of intriguing questions; in particu- 
lar, the policy issues on which it ends are very important. She presents three 
basic propositions, namely that the emergence of significant two-way flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) requires a fundamental shift in both analytical 
perspective and policy stance and that firms consider FDI as part of an overall 
international strategy. I will deal with each of these propositions separately. 
1.  Emergence of Significant Two-way Flows of FDI Requires 
Fundamental Shift in Analytical Perspective. 
It is true that the relative position of the United States as a home country has 
decreased and that, as far as FDI outflows are concerned,  there is a rough parity 
between the EC, Japan, and the United States, the three areas that make up the 
Triad (together, they account for about 80 percent of world FDI  outflows) (See 
UNCTC 1991.) It is also true that the United States, as part of the triad that 
accounts for some 70 percent of world FDI inflows, has become the principal 
host country. And it is true that this raises all sorts of  issues for the United 
States as host country, including those raised in  the paper (e.g., impact on 
trade, employment, industry competition, and profits). But these issues are not 
new-there  is a large literature that looks at these issues from the perspective 
of host countries in Western Europe or the developing world. Hence, it is not 
clear why the decline of  the United States as a home and its size as a host 
country should require a fundamental shift in analytical perspective. 
On the other hand, the rise of  FDI  inflows into the United States should 
stimulate analysis that revisits the work on FDI impact and systematically re- 
views the impact of FDI inflows on the economic growth of host countries. 
Given some changes in the world economy (e.g., the globalization of  firms 
and  industry, the  importance of  new  technologies, the  importance of  the 
services sector, regionalization), such a reexamination could indeed be quite 
useful. 54  Rachel McCulloch 
2.  Firms Consider FDI as Part of Overall International Strategy for 
Global Production and Sales 
I agree with the second proposition. Firms do indeed, regard exports, pro- 
duction abroad (i.e., FDI), licensing, and other forms of nonequity linkages as 
alternative ways to deliver goods and services to foreign markets. But it should 
be noted that the alternative of export versus production abroad does not apply 
to many services because these are not tradable. A good part of the text reads 
as if  it dealt with all FDI, while in reality some of the discussion (e.g., the 
progression from exports to foreign production) only applies to the industrial 
sector. The paper would benefit from an explicit discussion of the manner in 
which this proposition holds in the services sector. In this respect, the increas- 
ing tradability of some services would deserve attention. 
But the approach that FDI should be  seen as an integral part of  a firm’s 
overall global strategy is a promising one and deserves further investigation. 
The focus of analysis would become international production: the emergence 
of a system of value-added activities across national boundaries that integrates 
international, capital, trade, technology, and training flows within the frame- 
work of firms. Is such an international production system actually emerging? 
If  so, what is its nature? In which industries is it particularly important? How 
important is it? And so on. 
3.  Emergence of Significant Two-way Flows of FDI Requires 
Fundamental Shift in Policy 
I agree with the final proposition but for reasons other than those developed 
in the paper. McCulloch suggests that, because the United States is now both 
a significant home country and host country, it may waver in the future in its 
commitment to an open, multilateral FDI regime. She also suggests that the 
United States is the “strongest voice for international action to regulate invest- 
ment policies.” The first point is well taken. Now that FDI is becoming rela- 
tively more important in the U.S. economy (although it is still considerably 
less important than in, say, the United Kingdom or Canada), there are voices 
that urge a restriction in inward investment. Such a course could have unfortu- 
nate implications for efforts to build an international regime for FDI and must 
therefore be carefully watched. As to the second point, it is necessary to spec- 
ify that support for international action means support for an open system- 
that is, a system that defines primarily the rights of foreign investors and the 
responsibilities of governments and is fairly silent about the responsibilities of 
investors and the rights of governments. To be equitable and durable, a multi- 
lateral system ought to be balanced and hence address the rights and responsi- 
bilities of  both foreign investors and governments. The current international 
situation offers a window of opportunity to establish such a system, but it does 
not look as if major steps are being made to seize that opportunity. 55  New Perspectives on Foreign Direct Investment 
That does not mean, however, that no progress is being made. Most im- 
portant in this respect are the achievements of the Uruguay Round in the areas 
of  services (the General Agreement  on Trade  and  Services, or  GATS,  if 
adopted, will cover FDI in services) and TRIMS. But some progress has been 
made in the Development Committee of the IMF and the World Bank, which 
have adopted guidelines; progress is being made by the OECD, where efforts 
have begun to devise an investment regime incorporating, among other things, 
the  liberalization  codes  and  the  guidelines  for  transnational corporations 
(TNCs); and of course there is the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporation. All this, however, does not necessarily involve a 
new policy stance but rather is a continuation of old policies. 
But a new policy stance is needed, because FDI is now probably the most 
important form of international economic transaction; as Raymond Vernon put 
it in the discussion: “The proportion of current account transactions attribut- 
able to TNCs has gone up dramatically.” This has happened as a result of the 
absolute growth of  FDI, its relative importance (e.g., foreign production is 
more important than exports in bringing goods and services to foreign mar- 
kets), and the interlinkages of FDI and other international transactions (e.g., 
a good part of  trade is intrafirm trade). As a result, as mentioned earlier, an 
international production system is emerging. 
No international policy framework exists, either for FDI or for international 
production, in the same way as it exists, for instance, for trade. The framework 
ought to approach international economic transactions from the perspective of 
FDI, given the importance of  FDI per se and the way  in which it shapes a 
significant share of  international trade and technology flows. (Transnational 
Corporations and Management Division [  199  11  addresses some of  these is- 
sues.) Such a framework would, for instance, address strategic FDI policy- 
which is referred to in the paper but only from a rent-snatching perspective, 
not as a strategic, long-term approach. It would deal with investment-related 
trade measures (IRTMs), in the same way in which the GATT framework deals 
with TRIMS.  It could make provisions for transparency regarding FDI policies 
and institute FDI policy review, patterned on GATT’s trade policy review. It 
would also have to address the question of maintaining competition in the face 
of globalizing firms and industries and perhaps establish an international com- 
petition authority as a focal point for international policies in a world in which 
international production is assuming importance. 
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Discussion Summary 
Michael  Adler  started the discussion by  asking whether the main issue ad- 
dressed by the literature on direct investment could be more clearly identified. 
He suggested one candidate: an evaluation of the contribution of FDI to eco- 
nomic development in host countries. In the current environment, an important 
issue is the possibility that FDI might substitute for the official and private 
portfolio investment that has dominated capital flows to developing countries 
in recent years. 
Rachel McCulloch observed that the conventional wisdom in host countries 
has come full circle. Their preference  had been for portfolio investment inflows 
and local ownership, but host country preferences seem to have shifted toward 
direct investment. There is now a widespread view that FDI involves imports 
of knowledge and efficiency as well as capital. 
Ray Vernon observed that the theory of FDI is concerned with patterns of 
corporate control rather than with net financial transfers from direct investors 
to host countries. He would emphasize, for example, incentives for firms in 
oligopolistic industries to match direct investments by competitors, in order to 
ensure access to markets and inputs. 
Robert Lipsey reminded participants that hostility to direct investment had a 
long history, not just in developing countries, but also in the United States in 
the nineteenth century. What is quite different today is that developing coun- 
tries are encouraging and even subsidizing FDI. 
Michael Adler asked whether subsidies to FDI could be efficient policies 
and, if  so, what form would they take? 
Ann Harrison pointed out that, in practice, FDI was often attracted by offer- 
ing protection or was concentrated in protected industries. It is not clear this is 
an efficient policy. 
Rachel McCulloch argued that in cases where FDI involved a valuable tech- 
nology transfer, a small tariff could be optimal for the host country. 